This paper investigates the trade-diversion effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs), socalled "Spaghetti bowl" Phenomenon (SBP), in multilateral trade. The SBP is due to the proliferation of RTAs. Thus, I investigate the relationship between the number of RTAs concluded by a country and the additional trade value attributed to an RTA. Using bilateral trade data in a sample of 119 countries, from 1995 to 2012, my main finding reveals a negative tradeeffect between them, confirming the existence of SBP multilateral trade. However, results could not conclude evidence of a negative effect of overlapping RTAs, involving the existence of SBP, within North-North, North-South or South-South trade. But, the additional trade value attributed to an RTA concluded with EU countries or US seems to confirm significantly a tradediversion effect because of the number of RTAs signed by these countries.
Introduction
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 1 are sweeping the multilateral trade system like wildfire while WTO talks advance at a glacial rate (Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012) .
There has been renewed interest in RTAs in the two decades especially after the Doha round talks stalled. As Bhagwati (2008) noted, the regionalism is a threat to the multilatelalism. A "...major drawback of this free trade regime has been identified, which tends to proliferation of regionalism at the cost of dilution of multilateralism" (Pandey, 2006: 1) 2 . The most common theoretical explanation is that negotiators are frustrated attempting to achieve multilateral free trade. Thus, Nations are increasingly eager to negotiate bilaterally removing barriers because multilateralism talks are progressing so slowly (e.g. Krugman, 1993; Bhagwati, 2008) . 3 Also, the multiple memberships of RTAs may generate duty-free market access and zero-tariffs on imports with many trading partners and can hence be an appealing alternative to national policy makers as a substitute to free trade (Schiff and Winters 2003: 75) . Therefore, RTAs have become a ubiquitous feature of global trade.
Since 2001, the international trade is a drastic increase in RTAs across the world (see Fig. 1a ). In general, the formation of RTAs between countries has evolved. For a long time, most RTAs were regional in focus with members being geographically close to 1 In what follow, I take Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to mean any preferential access for members of such an agreement. Thus RTAs are used to encompass set of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Customs Unions (CUs), and Common Markets (CMs). In practice, there are some differences between these categories of RTAs. In a FTA group, countries enforce their own external trade restrictions. In a CU group, members adopt a common set of external trade restrictions (Grant ant Lambert, 2008) . In a CM area, the movement of factors must be unrestricted and fiscal, monetary, and other economic policies must be harmonized between members (DeRosa, 1998) . Note that RTAs were conceived as an exception to Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause to cater to the specific needs of developing as well as developed countries (see Art. XXIV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -GATT). According provisions on RTAs in GATT, the formation of a RTA commits members to eliminate restrictions on "subtantially" all trade. 2 Pandey, Sanjay, Spaghetti Bowl Phenomenon and Crucification of Multilateralism: Task Ahead for WTO (December 10, 2006) . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=951392 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.951392 (accessed on 8 august 2014). 3 According to Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) , the Bilateralism/Regionalism phenomenon may also explained by idiosyncratic events (such as the US's opening of the US-Canada FTA talks in 1996, the breakup of the USSR in 1991, and the Asian Crisis of 1997) and by some institutional needs (such as democracy, transparency, and geopolitical stability). " (Grant and Lambert, 2008: 765) . Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) explain the multiplication of RTAs by contagion effet testing the hypothesis that the domino-like spread of regionalism is partly driven by 'defensive' RTAs.
[Figure 1 (here)]
Theorically the nature of an RTA is to promote trade and investment between members (see Fig. 1b ). But, the formation of a RTA has different impact on partner states and third countries (trade creation and diversion effects). "On one hand, liberalization with certain trade partners generates positive effects as high-cost products in the home country can be substituted to low-cost products from the partner countries [trade creation effect]. One the other hand, as preferential integration is discriminatory, countries outside the agreement face higher tariffs than the member [trade diversion effect]" (Fergin, 2011: 6) . The products from a non-member country will instead be imported from member countries that do not face tariffs, even though they are not the most efficient producers. According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009: 171) , RTAs has generated a new inefficiency and this is 
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the trade diverting part. The main critic of preferential integration is that regional trading blocs limit global trade liberalization due to high external trade barriers (Fergin, 2011) .
However, the proliferation of RTAs would create a so-called "Spaghetti bowl"
phenomenon (SBP) in global trade (Bhagwati, 1995) . The "Spagetti bowl" is a metaphor to illustrate the numerous and crisscrossing RTAs, where innumerable applicable tariff rates and a multiplicity of rules of origin (RoOs) must coexist. According to Bhagwati et al. (1998) , this situation impose higher transaction to firms and distort trade and investment flows. That is the "Spaghetti bowl" phenomenon (SBP) which negatively impacts trade. In academic litterature, except Kimura et al. (2006) and Fergin (2011) , the trade effect of "Spaghetti bowl" phenomenon (SBP) has no been seriously quantify. As These results are likely overestimated. Their estimating model does not control for the 'gravitational un-constat' 6 and for self-selection into RTAs. Moreover, "the discussion about proper econometric specification of gravity model has shown that the conventional cross-section formulation without the inclusion of country-specific effects is misspecified and so introduces a bias in the assessment of the effects of RTAs" (Carrère, 2006: 224) .
For these reasons the findings of RTAs effect in Kimura et al. (2006) are likely to be unreliable because of estimation bias.
Fergin (2011) discusses the spaghetti bowl effect, which can be regarded as a potential negative transaction cost effect of RTA proliferation. Using also cross sectional data covering intra-Africa bilateral trade flows for Africa's 53 countries, she conclude "any robust evidence for the hypothesis of a negative trade effect caused by the spaghetti bowl phenomenon on the RTA effect" Fergin (2011: 32) .
In contrast to the cross-section gravity model used by these authors, I apply in this paper a panel gravity specification (modeling as ramdom effects) which includes countrytime fixed effects. This panel specification controls for unobservable characteristics of each country-dyad. In sum, I investigate the trade-diversion effects of RTAs like a "Spaghetti bowl" phenomenon (SBP) with proper econometric specification of the gravity model following recent empirical discussions.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follow. Section 2 develops my estimating equation taking into account relevant empirical methods on RTA's trade effects. Section 3 discusses data used for estimations. My empirical results are reported in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
Empirical modelling
To examine the relationship between proliferation of RTAs (so-called "Spaghetti Bowl" Phenomenon) and trade promotion, I adopt a typical gravity-type regression of the log-linearized form:
T represents export values of country i to country j at time t. To measure the trade-effect attributed of RTAs, I intrduce in equation (1) log( ) log( ) log( )
The trade-effect of RTA is examined on the coefficient
The estimates of this coefficient of interest, from equation (2) bias on estimates of effect of RTAs on trade, "...because a country pair that has more to gain from regional integration is more likely to create an RTA and to choose the appropriate nature of regional integration" (Shahid, 2011: 16) . To deal for this endogeneity bias, literature suggests to use a panel data with county pair and countryand-time fixed effects (Heckman 2001; Wooldridge, 2002) . But, this method does not allow investigating which kinds of country pairs gain more from RTA even if it yields consistent estimates (Vicard, 2011: 189 
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) interacted with RTA dummy.
Estimating equations
I define my gravity equation using country-and-year fixed effects, but not adding bilateral-pair fixed effects. This is unnecessary since the country-pair variables (distance, contiguity, common language, legal system, etc.) control for the idiosyncratic bilateral trade factors. Thus, the equation (2) is rewritten adding country-and-year fixed effects (
FE and t j FE ). As pointed out by Baldwin (2006) , the increase in the number of RTAs can be described as a spaghetti bowl of trade agreements. I introduce an interaction variable between the number of RTA concluded by each country and the RTA membership dummy to measure "Spaghetti bowl" phenomenon (SBP) effect on trade: Also, introducing bilateral-pair effects would entail additional regressors which due to the large dataset was not possible to compute. Figure 2 gives an overview of the negative effect of RTAs' proliferation, so-called "Spaghetti bowl" phenomenon (SBP).
[ The dummy variables "common border", "common legal", "common colonizer"
and "common language" were from CEPII. To account a potential impact of the economic crisis (in 2008/2009) on international trade flow, I introduce a dummy variable "crisis" in order to control for that in estimations. Also, I introduce another dummy variable "GATT/WTO" to control for trade-effect of WTO membership accession. Table 1 gives the details about sources and data construction of variables, and description statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2 .
[ [ defined as a proxy for measuring the "Spaghetti bowl" phenomenon (SBP).
Furthermore, the coefficients estimated in column (2) Otherwise, in models with log-transformed dependent variables, dummy variables can be interpreted as elasticity (Sorgho and Bruno, 2014; Giles, 1982) . 15 For this interpretation, I considered estimates from log-transformed regression (column 3).
Therefore, the coefficient for the variable SBP can be discussed as the effect of third
RTAs signed by at least one of the parties on trade in a dyad having a RTA. Also, the 14 The result of RTA trade-effect in column (2) is also significantly close to that found in the recent literature about RTAs' trade-creation (e.g. Magee, 2008; Baier and Berstrand, 2009; Vicard, 2011; Foster, Poeschl and Stehrer, 2011; Dai, Yotov and Zylkin, 2014 ) . considering that the negative trade-effect of the RTAs' proliferation around the world.
[Table 4 (here)]
Now I would like to know in which trading dyad the spaghetti bowl effect (SBP)
is the most stringent. Table 4 reports the PPML-estimates from the equation (4) For the ten subsamples considered, I remark that estimates for the North-North (2) and (4) 
Conclusion
This paper investigates empirical analysis on the spaghetti bowl phenomenon related to overlapping RTAs as pointed out by Bhagwati (1995) . My empirical findings suggest a significantly negative relationship between the number of RTAs concluded by a country and the additional trade value attributed to a RTA conclusion. Trade with the EU or US seems to be particularly the most affected by this effect of spaghetti bowl. In sum, instead of promoting trade, the multiplication of RTAs might instead result trade diversion effects because of higher transaction costs due to a mass of overlapping rules. Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses, pooled data by country pair (importer-exporter). Coefficients with * indicate significance at the 10% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% level, and *** indicate significance at the 1% level.
